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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 This appeal arises under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, as amended in 1991.  At issue is the legality of a 
residency requirement for firefighter candidates imposed by 
North Hudson Regional Fire and Rescue (North Hudson), a 
fire department comprising five New Jersey municipalities.  
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The United States District Court for the District of New 
Jersey held the residency requirement invalid because it has a 
disparate impact on African-American applicants.  North 
Hudson and six Hispanic firefighter applicants appeal the 
District Court’s judgment. 
I 
 A.  Overview of Firefighter Hiring in New Jersey 
 New Jersey state law has regulated the hiring of 
firefighters for nearly a century.  The current governing 
statute, the New Jersey Civil Service Act (Civil Service Act), 
was enacted in 1986 and establishes rules and procedures 
governing public employment that are intended to “advance 
employees on the basis of their relative knowledge, skills and 
abilities.”  N.J. Stat. Ann. 11A:1-2.  Among other things, the 
Civil Service Act requires New Jersey municipalities to fill 
civil service jobs, including firefighter, pursuant to a process 
controlled by the New Jersey Department of Personnel 
(NJDOP).1
                                                 
1 In 2008, the NJDOP was replaced by the Civil 
Service Commission.  See Brief History, State of N.J. Civ. 
Serv. Comm’n, http://nj.gov/csc/about/about/history/ (last 
visited Nov. 15, 2011).  The testing and ranking tasks 
formerly performed by the NJDOP are now assigned to the 
Division of Selection Services.  See Division of Selection 
Services, State of N.J. Civ. Serv. Comm’n, 
http://nj.gov/csc/about/divisions/selection/ (last visited Nov. 
15, 2011). 
  The NJDOP periodically creates, administers, and 
scores a firefighter examination.  It then publishes hiring lists 




account for the hiring preferences a given municipality 
applies.  New Jersey regulations permit local governments to 
give a hiring preference to their own residents, N.J. Admin. 
Code § 4A:4-2.11, and numerous municipalities do so. 
 In some New Jersey municipalities, residency 
requirements are not only permitted, but judicially mandated.  
In 1977, the United States Department of Justice sued twelve 
municipalities—Atlantic City, Camden, East Orange, 
Elizabeth, Hoboken, Jersey City, New Brunswick, Newark, 
Passaic, Paterson, Plainfield, and Trenton—alleging that they 
engaged in race-based discrimination with respect to testing 
and appointments in the hiring and promotion of firefighters.  
See United States v. New Jersey, Nos. 77-2054, 79-0184 
(D.N.J. filed Oct. 4, 1977).  The case was settled on May 30, 
1980 by a consent decree (Consent Decree) that mandated 
residency requirements in those twelve municipalities 
(Consent Decree Municipalities) and remains in effect over 
thirty years later.2
 B.  North Hudson’s Residency Requirement 
 
 Against this historical backdrop, North Hudson was 
formed in 1998 as a consortium of five municipalities: 
Guttenberg, North Bergen, Union City, Weehawken, and 
                                                 
2 Although the Consent Decree purported to establish 
that “[r]emedial actions and practices required by the terms or 
permitted to effectuate and carry out the purpose of [the 
Consent Decree] shall not be deemed discriminatory within 
the meaning of [the disparate treatment statute,] 42 U.S.C. [§] 
2000e-2(a),” we note that disparate-impact claims had not 
been statutorily defined at the time of the Consent Decree and 
thus were unaffected by it. 
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West New York.  At the time North Hudson was formed, 
each of its member municipalities imposed a residency 
requirement, so North Hudson continued that practice.  The 
validity of North Hudson’s residency requirement is the 
subject of this appeal. 
 Like all New Jersey fire departments, North Hudson is 
subject to the Civil Service Act, which requires it to hire 
pursuant to statewide NJDOP testing and ranked lists derived 
therefrom.3
                                                 
3 The NJDOP firefighter exams relevant to this 
litigation were administered in 1999, 2002, 2003, and 2006.  
A more recent exam was given in October 2010.  See Entry 
Level Firefighter Examination, State of N.J. Civ. Serv. 
Comm’n,http://www.state.nj.us/csc/authorities/faq/safety/firef
ighters.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2011).  Because the expert 
reports in this case were prepared prior to the 2010 exam, the 
results of that test are not at issue. 
  Applicants who pass the written exam undergo a 
physical test, and the ranked lists are derived from the results 
of both assessments.  These rankings are used to publish 
eligibility lists.  The Civil Service Act requires organizations 
to hire from the lists in rank order, and pursuant to New 
Jersey’s “Rule of Three,” North Hudson must offer each open 
position to one of the three highest ranked candidates on the 
eligibility list provided by the NJDOP.  N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 11A:4-8; see also In re Foglio, 22 A.3d 958, 959 (N.J. 
2011) (describing the Rule of Three mandate).  As is common 
practice in New Jersey, the eligibility lists created for North 
Hudson include only candidates who lived in one of its five 
member municipalities when they took the written exam 




sees the names or scores of ineligible non-resident applicants.  
North Hudson’s Residents-Only List also indicates a 
preference for veterans and accounts for volunteer firefighting 
experience and other statutorily mandated criteria.  After a 
candidate is selected from the Residents-Only List, North 
Hudson battalion or deputy chiefs verify the candidate’s 
residency at the time of hiring.  Once the candidate has been 
hired, however, he may live anywhere; some North Hudson 
firefighters and officers live in neighboring counties or as far 
as sixty miles away. 
 As of 2000, the population of North Hudson’s member 
municipalities was 69.6% Hispanic, 22.9% white non-
Hispanic, and 3.4% African-American.  In 2008, the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) reported that 
North Hudson employed 323 full-time employees, including 
302 firefighters.  North Hudson’s firefighter ranks included 
240 white non-Hispanics, fifty-eight Hispanics, and two 
African-Americans. 
 When this litigation began, North Hudson sought to fill 
thirty-five to forty new firefighter positions.  The six Hispanic 
applicants who intervened in this case (Intervenors) earned 
passing scores on the 2006 NJDOP firefighter exam and 
satisfied North Hudson’s residency requirement.  Based on 
their scores on the 2006 exam, Intervenors were ranked 
twenty-first, twenty-fifth, twenty-sixth, forty-fifth, forty-
ninth, and seventieth on North Hudson’s Residents-Only List.  
Given their rankings, Intervenors claim they would have been 





 C.  The Rodriguez Settlement 
 Like that of many other New Jersey fire departments, 
the racial composition of North Hudson has been the subject 
of legal challenge.  In 2001, thirteen Hispanic firefighters 
sued North Hudson for disparate-impact discrimination in 
promotions.  See Rodriguez v. N. Hudson Reg’l Fire & 
Rescue, No. 01-3153 (D.N.J. filed July 2, 2001).  After almost 
four years of litigation, the parties settled the case.  In the 
settlement agreement (Rodriguez Settlement), North Hudson 
agreed to promote four of the plaintiffs, waive length-of-
service prerequisites for registering for the next chief/officer 
exam, and advertise in Spanish and English media to “attract 
additional qualified applicants of Hispanic/Latino origin.”  
The Rodriguez Settlement imposed no other hiring 
obligations on North Hudson, however.  Although the 
Rodriguez Settlement dealt primarily with promotional 
practices, the advertising initiatives may have increased 
Hispanic hiring.  Whereas in 2001 the Rodriguez plaintiffs 
alleged that only 7% of North Hudson firefighters were 
Hispanic, in 2007, 38% of new hires were Hispanic, and by 
2008, the percentage of Hispanic North Hudson firefighters 
had climbed to 19%.  None of the Plaintiffs or the Intervenors 
in this appeal was a party to the Rodriguez case. 
 D.  NAACP’s Disparate-Impact Claim 
 In April 2007, the Newark Branch of the NAACP, the 
New Jersey Conference of the NAACP, and firefighter 
candidates Allen Wallace, Lamara Wapples, and Altarik 
White (collectively, NAACP Plaintiffs) sued North Hudson 
alleging that its residency requirement causes a disparate 
impact on African-American applicants.  In February 2009, 
the District Court certified the NAACP Plaintiffs’ class and 
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preliminarily enjoined North Hudson from hiring firefighters 
from its then-current eligibility list, which included only those 
candidates who were residents of the North Hudson 
municipalities when they took the statewide exam.  NAACP v. 
N. Hudson Reg’l Fire & Rescue, 255 F.R.D. 374 (D.N.J. 
2009).  North Hudson filed an interlocutory appeal. 
 While that appeal was pending, in June 2009, the 
Supreme Court decided Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 
(2009), and in September 2009, the District Court permitted 
six Hispanic firefighters eligible for hiring based on North 
Hudson’s then-current list to intervene.  Because Ricci 
involved the interplay between disparate-impact and 
disparate-treatment claims, we remanded the case sua sponte 
to the District Court in March 2010. 
 On April 23, 2010, the District Court found that North 
Hudson’s residency requirement might be lawful because of 
“business necessity.”  Based on that finding and equitable 
considerations, the District Court vacated the preliminary 
injunction. 
 After the preliminary injunction was vacated, the 
parties moved for summary judgment.  The NAACP Plaintiffs 
sought judgment on their disparate-impact claim and a 
permanent injunction against North Hudson’s use of the 
Residents-Only List.  North Hudson argued that the NAACP 
Plaintiffs failed to establish a causal relationship between the 
residency requirement and the statistical disparity in its 
African-American employment ratio.  Alternatively, North 
Hudson claimed it had established the business-necessity 
defense.  In addition, North Hudson and Intervenors claimed 
that Ricci provided a separate defense, and Intervenors sought 
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attorney’s fees for their role in causing vacatur of the District 
Court’s February 2009 preliminary injunction. 
 The District Court granted the NAACP Plaintiffs’ 
motion, permanently enjoined North Hudson’s use of its 
Residents-Only List, and denied Intervenors’ request for 
attorney’s fees.  NAACP v. N. Hudson Reg’l Fire & Rescue 
(North Hudson), 742 F. Supp. 2d 501 (D.N.J. 2010).4
 E.  Statistical Evidence and the District Court’s 
Findings 
 
 In adjudicating the parties’ motions for summary 
judgment, Judge Debevoise conducted an extremely thorough 
analysis of the facts and expert reports.  Because disparate-
impact claims depend heavily on statistical proof of 
discriminatory effects, we review the experts’ findings and 
the District Court’s conclusions at length. 
 1.  Dr. Richard Wright 
 The NAACP Plaintiffs presented the expert report of 
Dr. Richard Wright to establish their prima facie case of 
disparate-impact discrimination.  In his 2008 report, Wright 
identified disparities between the percentage of qualified 
African-Americans in the relevant labor market, which he 
                                                 
4 The District Court also referenced a state law claim, 
but “confined [its opinion] to discussion of Plaintiffs’ Title 
VII claim because the state law claim is analyzed in 
essentially the same way as the federal claim.”  North 
Hudson, 742 F. Supp. 2d at 506 n.2.  Neither party has raised 




defined in several alternative ways, and the percentage of 
African-Americans employed by North Hudson. 
 The District Court first considered Wright’s definition 
of the relevant labor market.  The U.S. Census Bureau 
reported that in 2003 the average daily commute was twenty-
four minutes nationally and twenty-nine minutes for North 
Hudson residents.  By performing a geographic information 
system analysis, Wright concluded that most people living 
within a ten-mile radius of North Hudson’s center would have 
no more than a twenty-nine-minute commute.  Wright also 
opined that North Hudson could reasonably be expected to 
draw its employees from across New Jersey because state-
regulated workers tend to search for jobs statewide.  Wright 
concluded that “the appropriate labor market from which 
North Hudson may be expected to draw its protective service 
personnel is either the whole state or the neighboring three-
county area.”  The District Court accepted this definition 
because it was “based in sound reasoning, and because [North 
Hudson] did not dispute” it, present evidence to contradict it, 
or suggest an alternative definition.  North Hudson, 742 F. 
Supp. 2d at 516. 
 The District Court next considered whether Wright’s 
comparisons demonstrated the kind of substantial statistical 
proof and causal relationship necessary to establish a prima 
facie disparate-impact claim.  To do so, Wright compared the 
proportion of African-Americans employed by North Hudson 
with the percentages of African-Americans employed in “full 
time protective service” positions in the Tri-County Area and 
in New Jersey.   The parties disputed—and continue to 
dispute—whether looking to the ratio of African-Americans 
in protective service jobs provides an accurate prediction of 
their expected presence in firefighting jobs.  Although Wright 
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parenthetically noted that protective service jobs consist of 
“mainly police officers [and] firefighters,” a 2000 list of 
North Hudson’s “Protective Service Occupations” codes 
suggests that this category may also include a substantial 
number of non-analogous positions, including crossing 
guards, gaming surveillance officers, private detectives and 
investigators, animal control workers, parking enforcement 
workers, and fish and game wardens.  Other positions with 
protective service codes, like lifeguards, transit and railroad 
police, and bailiffs and correctional officers, may involve 
some skills similar to those required for firefighting, but they 
unquestionably diverge in other significant ways.  The 
District Court concluded that “[t]he qualifications for 
employment in full time protective service work in the Tri-
[C]ounty [A]rea or in New Jersey would be similar to the 
qualifications to be employed by [North Hudson]” and that 
the protective service comparison “more closely track[ed] the 
requirement of a qualified population.”  North Hudson, 742 F. 
Supp. 2d at 517. 
 Wright’s results in this comparison were compelling.  
In the Tri-County Area, 37.4% of protective service positions 
are held by African-Americans.  Based on this percentage, 
one would expect 121 North Hudson firefighters to be 
African-American.  Similarly, 20% of protective service 
workers statewide are African-American, so, based on that 
percentage, one would expect North Hudson to employ sixty-
five African-American firefighters.  The differences of 13 and 
8.76 standard deviations in these comparisons leave “virtually 
no probability” that the discrepancies are the result of chance.  
Wright’s calculations indicated that African-Americans are 
“significantly under-represented” in North Hudson.  Given 
the near impossibility that the disparities are caused merely 
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by chance, Wright concluded: “[T]his likely results from 
discriminatory hiring practices.”5  The District Court agreed 
and found that “[t]he difference between these expected 
numbers of African Americans—121 or 65—and the actual 
number employed by [North Hudson]—2—is striking and is 
sufficiently substantial to raise an inference of causation.”6
                                                 
5 Although 2008 data indicate that only 302 of North 
Hudson’s 323 fire department personnel are firefighters, 
Wright used the 323 figure throughout his calculations.  
Given the standard deviations he describes, it is unlikely that 
amended calculations using the 302 figure would affect the 
ultimate conclusion that North Hudson’s hiring practices are 
causing a disparately small African-American firefighter 
population. 
  
North Hudson, 742 F. Supp. 2d at 517. 
 
6 Wright also compared the percentage of African-
American firefighters in North Hudson’s employ with the 
percentages of African-Americans in the general populations 
of several geographical areas around North Hudson and with 
the percentages of African-Americans employed full-time in 
state and local government in Hudson County and in New 
Jersey.  The District Court found that “[t]hese metrics, 
however, do not fully account for the requirement that the 
population be qualified,” and that “[c]ertainly the population 
in general cannot be assumed to be qualified for a job with 
[North Hudson], and it is unclear whether the qualifications 
for employment in state and local government in New Jersey 
would be similar to those required for a ranking on the DOP 
list.”  North Hudson, 742 F. Supp. 2d at 516–17.  Thus, the 
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 2. Dr. Bernard Siskin 
 After reviewing Wright’s opinion, the District Court 
examined the report of North Hudson’s expert, Dr. Bernard 
Siskin, to determine whether his findings undermined or 
contradicted the prima facie statistical evidence presented by 
Wright. 
 Siskin calculated the expected number of African-
Americans in North Hudson using the scores and rankings of 
actual applicants in the 1999, 2002, and 2006 NJDOP testing 
cycles.  Siskin created new eligibility lists using final test 
scores and veteran status to rank the candidates as though the 
candidate pool had included: (1) Hudson County, (2) the Tri-
County Area, (3) a five-mile radius, or (4) a ten-mile radius.   
As the District Court noted, “[u]sing the actual DOP test 
results obviously accounts for the requirement that the 
population being compared is ‘qualified.’”  Id.  Although 
expanding the eligibility list to include Hudson County or a 
five-mile radius added only one to two African-Americans to 
the top thirty-five candidates depending on the exam year, 
when the list was expanded to include the Tri-County Area, 
which was the relevant labor market according to the District 
Court, six to twelve African-American applicants placed in 
the top thirty-five, and six to fifteen placed in the top fifty.  
Yet, the actual Residents-Only Lists from those years 
included no African-Americans in that range.  Overall gains 
in the top ninety also were substantial, with expansion to 
include the Tri-County Area adding eleven to nineteen 
African-American candidates.  Thus, the District Court found 
that including the Tri-County Area caused “a significant 
                                                                                                             
District Court did not rely on these broader measures of the 
qualified labor market. 
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number of African Americans [to be] added to the DOP lists.”  
Id.  Siskin’s report noted that these gains came primarily at 
the expense of Hispanics, who moved down, often 
significantly, in the hypothetical expanded-list rankings.  
Siskin concluded that Caucasians would benefit most from an 
expansion of North Hudson’s hiring area. 
 Siskin acknowledged that his original hypothetical 
rankings assumed two things: “(i) that [non-resident 
candidates] would necessarily prefer appointment to [North 
Hudson] compared to any other jurisdiction they sought; and 
(ii) that they would be as likely to receive an appointment 
offer from [North Hudson] as from any other jurisdiction.”  
Because Siskin considered these assumptions unrealistic, he 
next calculated the hypothetical rankings omitting all non-
resident candidates who received appointments elsewhere 
during that hiring cycle, under the premise that they would 
have accepted those appointments instead of continuing to 
compete for a job with North Hudson.7
                                                 
7 Bolstering this assumption are NJDOP data that 
indicate a candidate is most likely to be appointed in the 
jurisdiction of residence; 60% of fire department 
appointments go to local residents.  For African-Americans, 
73% of those hired are hometown candidates. 
  Removing these 
otherwise-appointed candidates from the hypothetical 
expanded eligibility lists had varied effects for the different 
years studied.  For the 1999 hypothetical expanded list, it had 
no effect at all; the top thirty-five still contained twelve more 
African-Americans than North Hudson’s Residents-Only List.  
For the 2002 expanded list, there was no change to the top 
thirty-five (still six more African-Americans than on North 
Hudson’s 2002 Residents-Only List) and a decrease of only 
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two in the top fifty (still six more African-Americans than on 
North Hudson’s 2002 Residents-Only List). 
 As the District Court noted, “[t]he only tables that do 
not predict any added African Americans are Tables 7-2006 
and 8-2006.”  Id. at 518.  Those 2006 tables showed the most 
substantial change, but they also excluded a class of 
candidates included in the 1999 and 2002 lists.  Table 7-2006 
contains calculations which “exclud[ed] those appointed or 
having a better rank outside [North Hudson’s] local area.”  
This additional exclusion eliminated candidates who ranked 
“substantially better” on another municipality’s eligibility list.  
By Siskin’s definition, a candidate had a “substantially better” 
rank elsewhere if his rank on the North Hudson expanded list 
was at least twice his best rank on another municipality’s list 
(where lower numbers mean higher rankings on the eligibility 
lists).  “That is, a candidate ranked 12th on the expanded 
[North Hudson] list with a ‘best’ rank order number of six (6) 
or better on some other list would be excluded from the 
expanded [North Hudson] list.”  Likewise, a candidate who 
ranked third on the North Hudson list but first on another 
municipality’s list would be omitted, even though he had an 
identical chance of being hired by North Hudson under the 
Rule of Three.  The candidates remaining on the hypothetical 
expanded lists for 2006 were then re-ranked.  The result for 
the Tri-County expanded list was that no African-Americans 
were added to any of the ranges measured; all of them had a 
“substantially better” rank in another municipality. 
 The District Court doubted the value of the 2006 
tables: 
[W]hen the Court compares the results of Table 
8-2006 to Tables 8-1999 and 8-2002, . . . it 
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appears that the assumption underlying Table 8-
2006 may not bear out in reality.  Since Tables 
8-1999 and 8-2002 are based on the actual 
number of applicants who were hired by 
another department, the results in those tables 
are grounded in actual past events. 
Id. at 518.  Ultimately, the District Court concluded that the 
“assumption in 8-2006 far over-emphasizes the impact of 
hiring in other jurisdictions on the number of African 
American applicants who would be highly ranked on the Tri-
[C]ounty lists” and found that the 2002 and 1999 results were 
“more compelling.”8
                                                 
8 Siskin conducted a second analysis, but it played 
little role in the District Court’s decision and is unnecessary 
to our findings, so we summarize it only briefly.  Siskin used 
the difference between the percentage of African-Americans 
in North Hudson’s general population (3.4%) and the 
percentage of African-Americans in North Hudson’s fire 
department (0.62%) to establish a baseline percentage of 
African-Americans who are both interested in and qualified 
for firefighter positions (17.22%).  Siskin assumed that this 
relationship between race/ethnicity and interest/qualification 
holds true across all the geographical areas he studied and 
determined North Hudson would be expected to employ 
fifteen African-Americans if it hired from the Tri-County 
Area and eight if it hired from the entire state of New Jersey.  
Based on this second analysis, Siskin concluded that 
“removing the residency requirement would be expected to 
result in . . . a small ultimate increase in the percent of 
African Americans in [North Hudson’s] workforce.” 
  Id. at 519. 
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 Siskin’s overall assessment of the impact on African-
Americans was that “with the exception of the larger 
expanded (i.e., Tri-County) area, there is a trivial increase in 
African Americans.” 
 3.  District Court’s Conclusions 
 In the District Court’s view, Wright’s statistical 
evidence sufficed to establish a prima facie case of disparate 
impact, including both substantial statistical disparities and a 
causal link to North Hudson’s residency requirement.   The 
District Court then searched for contravening evidence from 
North Hudson’s own expert, but Siskin’s report revealed that 
“[his] own results predict[ed] that a significant number of 
qualified African Americans would be eligible and qualified 
for employment with [North Hudson] if the labor market were 
expanded to the Tri-[C]ounty [A]rea.”  Id.  Thus, “both 
experts’ reports support[ed] a statistical finding of disparate 
impact,” and North Hudson had “failed to raise a genuine 
dispute that the 2006 data predicts that no African Americans 
would be in the top-ranked candidates on a DOP list.”  Id. 
 The District Court next considered North Hudson’s 
business-necessity defense and rejected it because living in 
North Hudson was not a “mandatory minimum requirement” 
for familiarity with local geography, swift response times, or 
a bilingual firefighter force and because less discriminatory 
alternative means of achieving these goals were apparent.  Id. 
at 522–25.  It also found the residency requirement was not 
compelled by the Rodriguez Settlement.  Id. at 523–24.  Nor 
did the residency requirement ensure that North Hudson 
firefighters would live in the North Hudson municipalities 
after they were hired.  Id. at 523.  Finally, the District Court 
determined that the Supreme Court’s decision in Ricci v. 
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DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009), did not afford North 
Hudson an alternative defense because the expansion of its 
hiring list, to the detriment of Intervenors, would not be 
“because of race-base[d] statistics alone; . . . [but rather] 
because the residency requirement causes a disparate impact 
that is not justified by business necessity.”  North Hudson, 
742 F. Supp. 2d at 528.  North Hudson and Intervenors filed 
this appeal. 
II 
 The District Court exercised jurisdiction over the 
NAACP Plaintiffs’ Title VII claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331.  We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. 
 We exercise plenary review over a district court’s 
summary judgment decision, and we “apply the same test 
required of the district court.”  Groman v. Twp. of 
Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 633 (3d Cir. 1995).  On a motion 
for summary judgment, the movant must show that there is 
“no genuine issue as to any material fact,” such that he is 
“entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(a).  To be material, a fact must have the potential to alter 
the outcome of the case.  See Kaucher v. Cnty. of Bucks, 455 
F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006).  As the District Court correctly 
stated, “[d]isputes over irrelevant or unnecessary facts will 
not preclude a grant of summary judgment.”  North Hudson, 
742 F. Supp. 2d at 509.  Faced with a summary judgment 
motion, the court must view the facts “in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party.”  Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 
372, 380 (2007).  After the movant shows that there is no 
genuine issue for trial, the non-moving party then bears the 
burden of identifying evidence that creates a genuine dispute 
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regarding material facts.  See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 
U.S. 317, 323 (1986).  Ultimately, “[w]here the record taken 
as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the 
non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.”  
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 
U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 We review a district court’s grant of a permanent 
injunction for abuse of discretion.  United States v. Bell, 414 
F.3d 474, 478 (3d Cir. 2005).  An abuse of discretion occurs 
when the District Court’s decision “rests upon a clearly 
erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law, or an 
improper application of law to fact.”  ACLU of N.J. v. Black 
Horse Pike Reg’l Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1476 (3d Cir. 
1996) (quoting Int’l Union, UAW v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 820 
F.2d 91, 95 (3d Cir. 1987)).  We do not interfere with a 
district court’s discretionary judgments, unless it clearly erred 
in weighing the relevant factors and reaching a conclusion.  
Morgan v. Perry, 142 F.3d 670, 683 (3d Cir. 1998). 
III 
A 
 Title VII is intended to ensure that “the workplace [is] 
an environment free of discrimination, where race is not a 
barrier to opportunity.”  Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 
2674 (2009).  It endeavors “to promote hiring on the basis of 
job qualifications, rather than on the basis of race or color.”  
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 434 (1971) 
(quoting 110 Cong. Rec. 7247 (1964)).  In furtherance of this 
objective, Title VII makes it illegal for an employer to “limit, 
segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for 
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to 
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deprive any individual of employment 
opportunities . . . because of such individual’s race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2).  
Even “practices that are not intended to discriminate but in 
fact have a disproportionately adverse effect on minorities 
(known as ‘disparate impact’)” are unlawful.  Ricci, 129 S. 
Ct. at 2672.  “The touchstone is business necessity.”  Griggs, 
401 U.S. at 431.  “If an employment practice which operates 
to exclude [minorities] cannot be shown to be related to job 
performance, the practice is prohibited.”  Id. 
 Title VII’s disparate-impact provision prohibits 
employment practices that have the unintentional effect of 
discriminating based on race.  See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank 
& Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 987 (1988); Newark Branch, NAACP 
v. City of Bayonne, N.J., 134 F.3d 113, 121 (3d Cir. 1998).  
The statute provides: 
An unlawful employment practice based on 
disparate impact is established . . . only if . . . a 
complaining party demonstrates that a 
respondent uses a particular employment 
practice that causes a disparate impact on the 
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin and the respondent fails to demonstrate 
that the challenged practice is job related for the 
position in question and consistent with 
business necessity[.] 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).  “By enacting § 2000e-
2(k)(1)(A)(i), Congress allowed claims to be brought against 
an employer who uses a practice that causes disparate impact, 
whatever the employer’s motives and whether or not he has 
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employed the same practice in the past.”  Lewis v. City of 
Chicago, Ill., 130 S. Ct. 2191, 2200 (2010). 
 Disparate-impact litigation proceeds in three steps.  
First, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case by 
“demonstrat[ing] that application of a facially neutral 
standard has caused a ‘significantly discriminatory hiring 
pattern.’”  Bayonne, 134 F.3d at 121 (quoting Newark 
Branch, NAACP v. Town of Harrison, N.J., 940 F.2d 792, 798 
(3d Cir. 1991)).  This prima facie showing requires the 
plaintiff to prove a significant statistical disparity and to 
“demonstrate that the disparity [he] complain[s] of is the 
result of one or more of the employment practices that [he is] 
attacking.”  Id. (quoting Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. 
Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 657 (1989)). 
 The employer may defend against a prima facie 
showing of disparate impact only by demonstrating that the 
challenged practice is “job related for the position in question 
and consistent with business necessity.”  See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).  We have interpreted the business-
necessity defense to mean that employers may not use criteria 
which have a discriminatory effect unless those criteria define 
the minimum qualifications necessary to perform the job.9
                                                 
9 Prior to the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 
1991, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k), the Supreme Court 
held that an employment practice did not constitute “an 
artificial, arbitrary, or unnecessary barrier, [so long as] it 
measured skills related to effective performance in [the job],” 
Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 451 (1982), and required 
an employer to show only that “the practice further[ed] 
legitimate business goals ‘in a significant way,’” Harrison, 




See Lanning v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 181 F.3d 478, 481, 489 
(3d Cir. 1999) (“[I]n order to show the business necessity of a 
discriminatory cutoff score an employer must demonstrate 
that its cutoff measures the minimum qualifications necessary 
for successful performance of the job in question.”).  The 
employer bears the burdens of production and persuasion, see 
id. at 487, and must assert actual reasons why the challenged 
employment practice is important to the position; “the mere 
assertion of . . . conceivable bases is not sufficient,”  
Harrison, 940 F.2d at 804.  The Supreme Court has “refused 
to accept bare or ‘common-sense’-based assertions of 
business necessity and instead require[s] some level of 
empirical proof that challenged hiring criteria accurately 
predict[] job performance.”  El v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 479 
F.3d 232, 240 (3d Cir. 2007).  “[E]mployers cannot rely on 
rough-cut measures of employment-related qualities; rather 
they must tailor their criteria to measure those qualities 
accurately and directly for each applicant.”  Id.  Ultimately, if 
the employer cannot present compelling evidence of business 
necessity, “the plaintiff wins simply by showing the stated 
elements.”  Lewis, 130 S. Ct. at 2198. 
 Finally, a plaintiff can overcome an employer’s 
business-necessity defense by showing that alternative 
practices would have less discriminatory effects while 
ensuring that candidates are duly qualified.  See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii), (C).  Proving a less discriminatory, 
viable alternative requires supporting evidence.  One 
witness’s testimony identifying potential alternatives, 
                                                                                                             
current, more stringent “minimum qualifications” standard 
comports with the legislative repeal of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Wards Cove. 
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standing alone, “does not raise a genuine issue of material 
fact that [the alternative is] available to the [employer] . . . 
and that [it] would have produced less adverse impact.”  
Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2680. 
B 
 Statistical disparities alone can raise an inference of 
causation, but only when those disparities are substantial and 
the statistical evidence is reliable.  Bayonne, 134 F.3d at 121.  
In showing statistical disparity, the relevant comparison is 
“between the racial composition of [the at-issue jobs] and the 
racial composition of the qualified . . . population in the 
relevant labor market.”  Id. (alterations in original) (quoting 
Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 650) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Two of our prior decisions guide our analysis. 
 In Harrison, we considered a residency requirement’s 
effect on minority firefighter and police officer applicants.  
We found significant statistical proof of disparate impact, 
even though the African-American population of Harrison 
was only 0.2%, because no African-American had ever held a 
uniformed position while Harrison’s private work force was 
22% African-American.  940 F.2d at 796.  “[W]here black 
persons represent[ed] 0% of Harrison’s workforce, it 
matter[ed] little whether there [wa]s a disparity of 30%, 20% 
or even 10% or 15%.”  Id. at 800 (quoting NAACP, Newark 
Branch v. Town of Harrison, N.J., 749 F. Supp. 1327, 1340 
(D.N.J. 1990)).  Potential causes for the disparity, other than 
the residency requirement, had been eliminated.  “There 
[we]re multiple means to travel quickly between most of 
Essex County and Harrison,” and “qualified black persons 
would seek positions with Harrison’s municipal government” 
if the residency requirements were removed, so the disparity 
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could not be attributed to a lack of interest or an 
unwillingness to commute.  Id. at 797 (quoting Harrison, 749 
F. Supp. at 1341) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 In Bayonne, we also examined the characteristics and 
degree of statistical evidence required to make out a prima 
facie disparate impact claim.  In response to a lawsuit filed by 
the NAACP, Bayonne suspended its residency requirement 
for four years.  Bayonne, 134 F.3d at 115.  During the 
suspension, the number of African-American firefighters in 
Bayonne did not increase, and the number of African-
American police officers actually decreased.  Id.  When the 
four-year suspension ended, Bayonne reinstated its residency 
requirement.  In its challenge to the reinstatement, the 
NAACP presented statistical evidence showing that African-
Americans comprised only 2.6%  of the non-residents and 
only 5.5% of the residents hired as firefighters during the 
suspension of the residency requirement.  Id. at 118.  
Compared with the 3.5% African-American representation in 
Bayonne’s municipal workforce, however, it “would [have 
been] surpris[ing] if that [difference] was statistically 
significant.”  Id. at 118 n.10 (third alteration in original) 
(quoting the NAACP’s expert).  Nevertheless, the NAACP’s 
expert opined that the residency requirement was 
discriminatory.  Id.  The district court denied the NAACP’s 
request to enjoin the residency requirement, and we affirmed.  
Id. at 115.  As the district court explained, real statistical data 
were lacking: 
[W]e have had for the last day and a half 
evidence produced by David Griffin 
primarily which consists, with all due 
respect, of statistical possibilities relying 
upon data wherein he assumes that 
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Hudson County is the employment 
market by which comparisons shall be 
made as to whether blacks are being 
disparately impacted by the residency 
ordinance that was recently reinstated by 
the municipality of Bayonne . . . . 
With due respect to the doctor, his 
opinions, as he admits in one 
circumstance, are nothing more than his 
expression of common sense.  They are 
speculative.  They involve speculative 
contingencies and possibilities without 
any evidential basis. 
. . . 
We have well intentioned statistical 
platitudes. 
Id. at 119 (emphasis added). 
 On appeal, we concluded that causation was lacking 
because four years of data showed no change in the African-
American employment ratio while the residency requirement 
was suspended.  Moreover, the NAACP’s claim that an 
expanded eligibility list would contain more African-
Americans was insufficient to establish that the residency 
requirement was causing the disparity because Bayonne was 
required to hire in rank order from the NJDOP’s certified list; 
it was not allowed to select freely from the entire pool of 
candidates who had passed the test.  Id. at 122. 
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 Unlike in Bayonne, the NAACP Plaintiffs have 
provided ample evidence of not only a statistical disparity, 
but also a causal connection.  In more than a decade since 
North Hudson’s inception, it has hired only two African-
American firefighters (0.62% of its firefighters), despite an 
African-American population of 3.4%.  For the reasons we 
explained in Harrison, a minority workforce representation 
that low suggests discrimination. 
 That suggestion is borne out by both expert reports in 
this case.  They prove NAACP Plaintiffs’ prima facie case, 
and they do so with non-speculative data that do not suffer 
from the deficiencies of the expert testimony in Bayonne.  
Wright’s comparison of the proportion of African-Americans 
employed in Tri-County Area protective service positions 
(37.4%) with the proportion of African-Americans employed 
as firefighters by North Hudson (0.62%) shows a disparity 
that raises an inference of causation.  It suggests that North 
Hudson should employ sixty-five African-American 
firefighters, and it employs only two. 
 Although North Hudson now contests Wright’s 
definition of the relevant labor market to include the Tri-
County Area and even the entire state of New Jersey, it offers 
no alternative analysis to explain why the market should be 
defined more narrowly.  On the other hand, as the District 
Court acknowledged, Wright bolstered his definition of the 
labor market by pointing to commute times that do not exceed 
the average for North Hudson residents and the tendencies of 
those in this type of employment to seek positions statewide. 
 North Hudson also objects to Wright’s definition of 
the “qualified” population.  North Hudson points out an 
obvious flaw: neither the entire African-American population 
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nor the whole pool of African-American state and local 
government employees can be considered qualified for a 
firefighter position.  In Siskin’s words, Wright “never 
attempts to control for differences in the likelihood of being 
qualified for the position, as determined by the results of the 
[NJDOP] process for firefighter eligibility.”  See Bayonne, 
134 F.3d at 123 n.21 (“[L]ooking to the general population is 
not necessarily sufficient in situations . . . where the claim 
involves jobs with ‘special qualifications.’” (citing 
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 309 
(1977))).  But this argument is unavailing to North Hudson on 
appeal because the District Court agreed with Siskin on this 
point and instead based its summary judgment on the 
protective services comparison. 
 Wright’s analysis of full-time protective service 
employees—though imperfect because it includes several 
non-analogous positions—fairly, and as nearly as possible,10
                                                 
10 The NAACP Plaintiffs explain—and North Hudson 
and the Intervenors do not contest—that there are no EEOC-4 
data breaking down the full-time protective service positions 
into smaller clusters from which Wright might have been able 
to select employment data for a more closely analogous set of 
positions. 
 
approximates the pool of qualified African-Americans.  See, 
e.g., Green v. USX Corp., 896 F.2d 801, 804 (3d Cir. 1990) 
(“[W]here labor market statistics are unavailable, ‘certain 
other statistics—such as measures indicating the racial 
composition of “otherwise-qualified applicants” for at-issue 
jobs—are equally probative for this purpose.’” (quoting 
Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 650)); Carpenter v. Boeing Co., 456 
F.3d 1183, 1197 (10th Cir. 2006) (“To be sure, the population 
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selected for statistical analysis need not perfectly match the 
pool of qualified persons.  Such perfection may be impossible 
to obtain.  When reliable data regarding that pool are 
unavailable, a different population may be used if it 
adequately reflects the population of qualified persons.”); cf., 
e.g., Peightal v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 26 F.3d 1545, 1554–55 
(11th Cir. 1994) (finding a statistical comparison of the 
composition of the general 18-to-55-year-old population with 
the composition of the firefighter workforce sufficient after 
concluding that firefighter is an entry-level position).  But cf., 
e.g., Carpenter, 456 F.3d at 1197–99 (finding insufficient 
disparate-impact evidence where the expert’s “qualified 
population” failed to account for several overtime eligibility 
requirements specified in the controlling collective bargaining 
agreement and the expert did not explain why proxy measures 
(like “job” and “grade”) adequately approximated the actual 
requirements). 
 The full-time protective service positions are a 
sufficient proxy even though firefighting is a specialized job.  
Many of the full-time protective service positions require 
emergency medical training, physical fitness, calmness under 
pressure, and strategic decisionmaking in emergencies.  
Though none of the included positions—other than 
firefighter, of course—encompasses the full breadth of 
special skills required for firefighting, the law does not 
demand a perfect analog.  Cf., e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 
433 U.S. 321, 330–31 (1977) (finding disparate impact based 
on a comparison of height and weight requirements for prison 
guards with height and weight statistics based on national 
data and explaining that “reliance on general population 
demographic data was not misplaced where there was no 
reason to suppose that physical height and weight 
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characteristics of Alabama men and women differ markedly 
from those of the national population”); Harrison, 940 F.2d at 
799–800 (finding disparate impact based on a comparison of 
the percentage of African-Americans in Harrison’s public 
uniformed positions with that in its private workforce).  We 
agree with the District Court that the statistics yielded by 
Wright’s comparisons still show a sufficient statistical 
disparity to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact. 
 As the District Court concluded, North Hudson’s own 
expert not only failed to create a real dispute regarding 
Wright’s findings, but himself bolstered the causal link 
between the residency requirement and the disparity 
demonstrated in Wright’s calculations.  For each of the three 
years studied, Siskin’s tables indicate that if North Hudson 
had hired from a Tri-County List rather than its Residents-
Only List, it would almost certainly have hired many more 
African-Americans.  If North Hudson’s recent hiring needs 
are any indication, it might seek to hire thirty-five to forty 
firefighters in a given exam cycle.  Siskin’s hypothetical lists 
for the Tri-County Area predicted that between eight and 
sixteen of those hires would have been African-American in 
1999, 2002, and 2006.  Even assuming that African-
Americans were more likely to receive and accept firefighter 
positions in their hometowns during those years, six to twelve 
African-American candidates still would have placed within 
the top thirty-five candidates available to North Hudson. 
 Siskin’s only data suggesting that African-Americans 
would not have been hired from a Tri-County List appear in 
Tables 7-2006 and 8-2006, which inexplicably added an 
assumption which had not been part of the 1999 and 2002 
lists.  In these lists, Siskin eliminated candidates who were 
hired by other municipalities that year as well as candidates 
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who ranked “substantially better” on another municipality’s 
eligibility list.  As the District Court noted, “the assumption 
underlying Table 8-2006 may not bear out in reality.”  North 
Hudson, 742 F. Supp. 2d at 518.  The 1999 and 2002 
hypothetical lists eliminating those candidates who were 
actually hired by other municipalities showed that six to 
twelve African-Americans ranked in the top thirty-five would 
still have been available for hiring by North Hudson.  
Assuming that a 2006 table eliminating only those actually 
hired by other municipalities would have yielded similar 
results, Siskin’s data suggest that all the available African-
Americans ranked thirty-fifth and above in that type of 2006 
table were ranked seventeenth or above on other 
municipalities’ 2006 lists but did not receive jobs.  The 
additional elimination from Tables 7-2006 and 8-2006 of 
those who were better ranked on other municipalities’ lists 
but who were not ultimately hired purportedly would have 
removed all African-American candidates from the top 
ninety, thus making none available to North Hudson.  Siskin’s 
adjustment of the data is not accompanied by any explanation 
for why the adjustment was necessary in 2006 but not in 1999 
or 2002, why his definition of “substantially better” rank 
yields accurate predictions of hometown preferences, or why 
candidates who were not ultimately hired elsewhere would 
have been disinterested in working for North Hudson. 
 In light of the ample evidence of record, including 
Siskin’s other expanded lists, the District Court did not err in 
concluding that no genuine dispute of material fact exists as 
to whether North Hudson’s residency requirement creates a 





 Having found no error in the District Court’s 
conclusion that the NAACP Plaintiffs proved a prima facie 
case of disparate impact, we turn to its rejection of North 
Hudson’s defense that business necessity justifies the 
residency requirement.  As outlined above, we have 
interpreted the business-necessity defense to apply only when 
an employer can show that its challenged hiring criteria 
define minimum qualifications for the position.  See Lanning, 
181 F.3d at 481, 489 (holding that strong aerobic ability was 
not a necessary qualification for transit officers when many 
incumbent officers who never passed the challenged test later 
received commendations and promotions).  Even if business 
necessity is shown, the plaintiff will prevail if there are less 
discriminatory alternative means of selecting for the crucial 
qualification.  See, e.g., id. at 485. 
 In Harrison, we rejected the town’s purported 
justifications for hiring firefighters from a residents-only 
eligibility list.  We held that although emergency 
preparedness, i.e., the speed with which an employee 
firefighter could respond to an emergency call, was 
potentially crucial to the position, there were alternative ways 
to ensure short response times, such as establishing an 
acceptable response distance.  Harrison, 940 F.2d at 804–05.  
We also held that ensuring loyalty to the Harrison community 
was not an essential qualification.  See id. at 805.  Similarly, 
we rejected Harrison’s plea to avoid an expensive and time-
consuming increase in applications because that 




 In the District Court, North Hudson reprised several of 
the arguments we found wanting in Harrison.  North Hudson 
claimed that residency is essential to its fire department 
operations because it: (1) increases the likelihood that its 
firefighters will be able to respond to emergencies more 
quickly because they will be more familiar with the buildings 
and streets in the served community; (2) comports with the 
terms of the Rodriguez Settlement; (3) increases the number 
of Spanish-speaking firefighters in a department that serves a 
69% Hispanic population; and (4) fosters community pride. 
 We have no quarrel with the notion that a critical 
aspect of firefighting is the ability to respond quickly and that 
familiarity with the streets and buildings of a locale is 
important to achieving that goal.  But this valid point cannot 
be reconciled with the fact that North Hudson does not 
require its firefighters to reside in the North Hudson 
municipalities after they are hired.  In fact, in 2008, only 34% 
to 36% of North Hudson firefighters were residents.  See 
North Hudson, 742 F. Supp. 2d at 523 & n.18. 
 Nor does the Rodriguez Settlement provide a valid 
business justification for the residency requirement.  
Although that settlement encourages minority hiring and 
promotion, it does not compel the use of a residency 
requirement; it merely requires targeted advertising of exams.  
The other provisions of the Rodriguez Settlement were 
satisfied years ago when certain remedies were provided to 
the particular plaintiffs in that case.  Furthermore, North 
Hudson cannot claim that the residency requirement is part of 
its attempt to comply with the broad purpose of the Rodriguez 
Settlement because the residency requirement was in place 
before that lawsuit was filed. 
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 As for employing a certain number of Spanish-
speaking firefighters in a region that is 69% Hispanic, this is a 
plausible justification in the abstract.  But North Hudson 
failed to establish that the residency requirement leads to a 
greater number of Spanish-speaking firefighters.  Rather, this 
purported justification is a “conceivable” basis, which is 
insufficient to invoke the business-necessity defense.  See 
Harrison, 940 F.2d at 804.  Moreover, as the District Court 
noted, there are non-discriminatory ways to ensure the hiring 
of Spanish-speaking firefighters.  Rather than seek out 
Spanish-speakers by making the imprecise assumption that 
North Hudson residents are more likely to speak Spanish, 
North Hudson could, and actually does, seek out bilingual 
candidates. 
 Finally, as Harrison and the business-necessity 
standard itself make clear, community pride is not a sufficient 
justification for a discriminatory hiring practice. 
 In sum, the District Court properly concluded that 
North Hudson’s purported business-necessity arguments fail.  
They are not tied to minimum firefighter qualifications in 
North Hudson and, in some cases, less discriminatory 
alternatives are available. 
D 
 North Hudson argues that, even if it cannot show 
business necessity, the Supreme Court’s decision in Ricci 
offers it safe harbor.  Ricci established a defense for 
defendants in disparate-treatment suits who can show a 
“strong basis in evidence” to believe that failing to engage in 




 In Ricci, 118 firefighters in New Haven, Connecticut, 
took lieutenant and captain examinations to qualify for 
promotions.  129 S. Ct. at 2664.  When the exam results 
showed that no African-American candidate was eligible for 
promotion for failure to place in the top ten of either exam, 
  See 129 S. Ct. 2658.  North 
Hudson seeks to establish a defense in the converse situation, 
where an employer is charged with disparate-impact 
discrimination but fears disparate-treatment liability if it 
ceases the employment practice that is causing the disparate 
impact.  Specifically, North Hudson asserts that removing its 
residency requirement to eliminate the disparate impact on 
African-Americans would subject it to suit by Hispanics 
alleging disparate treatment. 
                                                 
11 The distinction between disparate impact and 
disparate treatment lies in the disparate-treatment requirement 
that the discrimination be intentional.  Title VII’s disparate-
treatment provision forbids an employer “to fail or refuse to 
hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).  
Disparate treatment “occur[s] where an employer has ‘treated 
[a] particular person less favorably than others because of’ a 
protected trait.”  Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2672 (first alteration in 
original) (quoting Watson, 487 U.S. at 985–86).  The plaintiff 
must prove that the employer had a “discriminatory intent or 
motive.”  Watson, 487 U.S. at 986.  Where the employment 
action was based on a non-discriminatory reason, disparate 
treatment is, by definition, lacking. 
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the city faced competing threats of suit.  Id. at 2664–66.  
Several minority firefighters claimed the exam results 
evidenced a discriminatory test.  Id. at 2664.  Others 
threatened litigation if the city discarded the results or denied 
promotion to the top performers on the exam.  Id.  After New 
Haven Civil Service Board hearings and discussions with city 
attorneys, New Haven decided to nullify the exam scores.  Id. 
 The white firefighters who were denied promotions 
following the nullification of the test results sued, alleging 
disparate treatment.  The district court granted and the Second 
Circuit upheld summary judgment for New Haven.  Id. at 
2671–72.  The Supreme Court reversed because New Haven’s 
nullification of the test results was a decision based on race, 
namely “too many whites and not enough minorities would 
[have been] promoted were the lists to be certified.”  Id. at 
2672–73 (quoting Ricci v. DeStefano, 554 F. Supp. 2d 142, 
152 (D. Conn. 2006)). 
 The Court considered “whether the purpose to avoid 
disparate-impact liability excuses what otherwise would be 
prohibited disparate-treatment discrimination.”  Id. at 2674.  
The Court rejected the argument that an employer’s mere 
good-faith belief that it must discriminate against individuals 
to avoid disparately impacting a protected group should be 
sufficient to shield the employer from disparate-treatment 
liability.  Id. at 2675 (“[W]hen Congress codified the 
disparate-impact provision in 1991, it made no exception to 
disparate-treatment liability for actions taken in a good-faith 
effort to comply with the new, disparate-impact provision in 
subsection (k).”).  Instead, the Court adopted the “strong basis 
in evidence” standard, which excuses an employer from 
disparate-treatment liability only if the employer shows a 
credible possibility of disparate-impact liability if it were not 
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to engage in the intentional discrimination being challenged.  
Id. at 2676.  The Court’s holding was specific: 
We hold only that, under Title VII, before an 
employer can engage in intentional 
discrimination for the asserted purpose of 
avoiding or remedying an unintentional 
disparate impact, the employer must have a 
strong basis in evidence to believe it will be 
subject to disparate-impact liability if it fails to 
take the race-conscious, discriminatory action. 
Id. at 2677; see also id. at 2664 (“We conclude that race-
based action like the City’s in this case is impermissible 
under Title VII unless the employer can demonstrate a strong 
basis in evidence that, had it not taken the action, it would 
have been liable under the disparate-impact statute.”). 
 Complying with the Supreme Court’s mandate, New 
Haven certified the exam results and promoted white 
firefighters consistent with the ranked list of eligible 
candidates.  Id.  As expected, an adversely affected African-
American firefighter sued, alleging that the test had a 
discriminatory effect, primarily because its 60/40 weighting 
of the written and oral portions of the test conflicted with the 
industry norm of 30/70.  See Briscoe v. New Haven, 654 F.3d 
200, 201 (2d Cir. 2011).  New Haven claimed that it could not 
be held liable because (1) the Supreme Court’s resolution of 
the viability of the prospective African-American firefighters’ 
disparate-impact claim as part of its Ricci decision precluded 
the suit, and (2) there was a “strong basis in evidence” that 
failing to certify the test results would lead to disparate-
treatment liability.  Id. at 202–03.  The Second Circuit refused 
to extend Ricci’s “strong basis in evidence” defense to the 
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disparate-impact suit against New Haven.  Id. at 205–09.  We 
likewise see no reason to extend Ricci’s “strong basis in 
evidence” defense to the NAACP Plaintiffs’ disparate-impact 
suit against North Hudson. 
 Here, there can be no doubt that removing the 
residency requirement will adversely affect Intervenors.  
They will lose their high rankings on North Hudson’s 
candidate hiring list and find it significantly more difficult to 
secure a firefighter position with North Hudson.  For 
example, if, as the NAACP Plaintiffs advocate, North Hudson 
hires from a list incorporating candidates from nearby Essex 
and Union counties,   Intervenors likely would not even rank 
within the top 180 candidates.  The Intervenors currently 
ranked twenty-first, twenty-fifth, and twenty-sixth would 
drop to 189th, 261st, and 292nd respectively, and those 
ranked forty-fifth, forty-ninth, and seventieth would not rank 
within the top 400 candidates. 
 Nevertheless, the facts and claims in this case are 
dissimilar to those in Ricci.  In Ricci, New Haven had already 
administered the purportedly illegal exam (the basis for the 
disparate-impact claim) and attempted to remedy the exam 
results by denying ten white firefighters the right to 
promotions (the basis for the disparate-treatment claim).  New 
Haven had to choose between irreconcilable alleged errors 
before it secured judicial guidance regarding the merits of the 
competing discrimination claims.  Here, North Hudson faces 
no such quandary.  At this juncture, North Hudson’s only 
action is the use of its Residents-Only List, which has been 
demonstrated to cause a disparate impact in violation of Title 
VII.  It has taken no steps to eliminate the residency 
requirement or otherwise adjust its policies to reduce the 
adverse effect.  Thus, North Hudson faces a classic disparate-
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impact claim, one that we have resolved based on the three-
step inquiry dictated by the statute. 
 Moreover, North Hudson has no basis for believing it 
will be liable to Intervenors or other North Hudson resident 
applicants under a disparate-treatment theory.  First, this 
Court, rather than North Hudson, is responsible for 
eliminating the residency requirement.  A government 
employer’s compliance with a judicial mandate does not 
constitute an official policy or employment practice of the 
employer, see, e.g., Wolfe v. City of Pittsburgh, 140 F.3d 236, 
240 (3d Cir. 1998), and it is an employer’s deliberate 
discrimination that the disparate-treatment provision of Title 
VII prohibits.  Removal of the residency requirement can 
hardly be viewed as a race-based decision when it is 
motivated by the imperative to comply with a judicial order.  
Besides, North Hudson would have a “legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason” for hiring more broadly, namely, 
the superior merit of higher-ranked non-resident applicants.  
See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 
(1973) (articulating the standards for disparate-treatment 
liability).  As the NAACP Plaintiffs correctly point out, 
Intervenors will not be removed from the eligibility lists; 
rather, they will compete based on objective criteria against 
candidates who were unlawfully excluded from the 
Residents-Only List.  Cf., e.g., Harrison, 940 F.2d at 810 
(rejecting amicus curiae’s due process claims that forcing 
them to compete with non-resident firefighter candidates 
would reduce their chances of being hired). 
 Finally, North Hudson’s repeated reliance on the 
possibility that it will face a lawsuit by its Hispanic resident 
candidates is unavailing.  “Fear of litigation alone” does not 
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suffice; a demonstrated potential for liability is required.  
Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2681. 
 In sum, we conclude that the District Court properly 
granted summary judgment to the NAACP Plaintiffs on their 
disparate-impact claim.  The NAACP Plaintiffs presented 
sufficient evidence to establish that North Hudson’s residency 
requirement causes a disparate impact by excluding well-
qualified African-Americans who would otherwise be eligible 
for available firefighter positions.  North Hudson failed to 
present evidence to create any genuine dispute regarding this 
disparate impact or adduce a valid business necessity for the 
residency requirement.  And Ricci is unavailing to North 
Hudson. 
IV 
 North Hudson and Intervenors claim that the inequities 
Hispanics will face if the residency requirement is removed 
counsel against imposing a permanent injunction against the 
use of the Residents-Only List.  In particular, North Hudson 
and Intervenors point to residency requirements compelled by 
the Consent Decree in many of the municipalities surrounding 
North Hudson.  Because of those residency requirements, 
North Hudson residents will be eligible for employment only 
in North Hudson while residents of other jurisdictions will be 
eligible in their hometowns and in North Hudson.  In other 
words, North Hudson will be forced to open its hiring to non-
residents while other municipalities exclude those, like 
Intervenors, who reside within North Hudson.  North Hudson 
and Intervenors certainly have a point in this regard.  But we 
have no authority to endorse discrimination against firefighter 
candidates who do not live in North Hudson in order to 
protect those who do.  Once a court identifies racial 
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discrimination, it must order relief that will remedy past 
discrimination and curb the potential for future 
discrimination.  See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 
405, 418 (1975) (quoting Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 
145, 154 (1965)). 
 Although district courts are afforded substantial 
discretion in fashioning injunctive relief, it should not be 
broader than required to provide a full remedy to the injured 
party.  See Meyer v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc’y, 648 F.3d 154, 
170 (3d Cir. 2011).  North Hudson and Intervenors do not 
argue that the District Court’s permanent injunction exceeds 
the bounds of its discretion or provides relief that is 
disproportional to the harms the NAACP Plaintiffs have 
proven.  Nor could they.  The permanent injunction against 
use of the Residents-Only List is properly circumscribed to 
eliminate the employment practice that the expert reports 
establish is causing the disparate impact. 
 Title VII cases demonstrate that inequities to one 
group accruing from remedies for discrimination against 
another group cannot forestall those remedies.  As we have 
explained, “Title VII itself clearly makes each employer 
responsible for its own employment practices, and does not 
support the proposition that one employer is free to 
discriminate against a class of employees as long as other 
employers are willing to hire them.”  Harrison, 940 F.2d at 
800 (internal citation omitted); see also id. at 801 
(“[R]esidency requirements imposed by other 
municipalities . . . were appropriately excluded from the 
district court’s definition of the relevant labor market.”).  The 
unavailability of firefighter positions outside North Hudson to 
North Hudson residents does not negate the discrimination 
perpetrated by the exclusion of non-residents from North 
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Hudson positions.  Moreover, the municipalities around North 
Hudson that impose their own residency requirements are not 
parties in this case, so we cannot adjudicate the legality of 
their policies.  If Intervenors or any other North Hudson 
residents believe the residency requirements of neighboring 
communities unlawfully discriminate against them, they 
remain free to challenge those employment practices.  
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s injunction.12
                                                 
12 Intervenors claim entitlement to attorney’s fees for 
influencing the District Court in April 2010 to vacate the 
preliminary injunction it granted in February 2009.  The 
District Court concluded that Intervenors should not receive 
attorney’s fees.  We see no abuse of discretion in the District 
Court’s decision.  A party prevails when it secures a “material 
alteration of the legal relationship of the parties in a manner 
which Congress sought to promote in the fee statute.”  Tex. 
State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 
782, 792–93 (1989).  Here, the District Court’s vacatur of the 
preliminary injunction was based on a “preliminary finding” 
that the residency requirement might be related to North 
Hudson’s business objectives and that equitable principles 
disfavored maintaining an injunction (an extreme form of 
relief) while a full consideration of the disparate-impact claim 
was undertaken.  See North Hudson, 742 F. Supp. 2d at 507.  
This type of temporary victory, especially when it is followed 
by the permanent injunction   Intervenors opposed, is not a 
“material alteration of [the parties’] legal relationship.”  Cf., 
e.g., Sole v. Wyner, 551 U.S. 74, 82–83 (2007) (holding that 
one who obtains a preliminary injunction but fails to secure a 
permanent injunction is not a prevailing party); West v. Keve, 





 For the reasons stated, we will affirm the District 
Court’s judgment in all respects. 
                                                                                                             
a ‘prevailing party’ standard . . . then an appellate court’s 
reversal on the merits may well require a redetermination of 
the fee issue.” (internal citation omitted)). 
